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ABSTRACT
While Kant’s claim that the moral law discloses our freedom to us has been
extensively discussed in recent decades, the reactions to this claim among
Kant’s immediate successors have gone largely overlooked by scholars.
Reinhold, Creuzer, and Maimon were among three prominent thinkers of the
era unwilling to follow Kant in making the moral law the condition for
knowing our freedom. Maimon went so far as to reject Kant’s method of
appealing to our everyday awareness of duty on the grounds that common
human understanding is susceptible to error and illusion. In this paper I shall
examine how these skeptical reactions to Kant’s position shaped the
background for Fichte’s method of moral justiﬁcation, leading up to his own
deduction of the moral law in the System of Ethics (1798). By way of
conclusion, I shall propose a new interpretation of how consciousness of the
moral law serves as an entry-point to Fichte’s form of idealism.
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…morality ﬁrst discloses to us the concept of freedom.
– Kant (KpV 5:30).
1. Introduction
While Kant’s claim that the moral law discloses our freedom to us has been
extensively discussed in recent decades, the reactions to this claim among
Kant’s immediate successors have gone largely overlooked by scholars. Karl
Reinhold, Leonhard Creuzer, and Salomon Maimon were among three promi-
nent thinkers of the era unwilling to follow Kant in making the moral law the
condition for knowing our freedom. Maimon went so far as to reject Kant’s
method of appealing to our everyday awareness of duty on the grounds
that common human reason is susceptible to error and illusion. In this
context J. G. Fichte stands out as a striking exception, since his writings
from the 1790s show a consistent interest in Kant’s commitment to moral
primacy. Moreover, at the height of his career in Jena, Fichte would end up
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radicalizing the idea of moral primacy, making it the basis of what he called his
‘entire science of knowledge’. In this paper I shall examine how these skeptical
reactions to Kant’s position shaped the background for Fichte’s method of
moral justiﬁcation, leading up to his own deduction of the moral law in the
System of Ethics (1798).1 By way of conclusion, I shall propose a new interpret-
ation of how consciousness of the moral law serves as an entry-point to
Fichte’s form of idealism.
2. Historical background: Kant
Although Kant struggled with questions of justiﬁcation for the majority of his
writing career, the Critique of Practical Reason (1788)2 set the agenda for think-
ing through the freedom-morality connection during this intellectual period.
Kant’s approach in this work proceeds in two stages, with the ﬁrst stage cul-
minating in his ‘reciprocity thesis’,3 and the second culminating in his ‘disclos-
ure thesis’.
The Reciprocity Thesis. The ﬁrst stage concerns the relationship between (1)
the concept of a transcendentally free will and (2) the concept of an uncondi-
tional practical law. Kant argues, to begin with, that when we ask what law is
ﬁt to legislate a transcendentally free will, the answer is that it cannot be a
material principle or a principle whose validity depends (in some way) on
empirical interests, impulses, or inclinations. Only a formal principle, or a prin-
ciple of the ‘mere lawgiving form of a maxim’, is ﬁt to legislate a will indepen-
dent of such elements. And Kant’s point is that the reverse claim is also true.
When we ask what constitution of will is suited to a formal principle, the
answer is that it cannot be an empirically conditioned will. It cannot be, for
example, the will of a Humean agent whose ends are assigned by the pas-
sions. Only a will free from the passions (a transcendentally free will) presents
the constitution suited to the concept of a formal law. Thus Kant concludes
that ‘freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other’
(KpV 5:29).
The Disclosure Thesis. What the reciprocity thesis tells us is that the concepts
of freedom and formal law stand in a relation of co-entailment. By virtue of
analyzing one, we are led in our reﬂections to the other, and vice versa. Yet
this is only the ﬁrst stage of Kant’s argument. After stating the reciprocity
thesis, he asks what term in this relation enjoys epistemic primacy over the
over. The question now is ‘from what our cognition of the unconditionally
practical starts’, that is, ‘from freedom or from the practical law’? (KpV 5:29).
1See Wood (Fichte’s Ethical Thought) and Ware (‘Fichte’s Deduction of the Moral Law’) for more detailed
treatments of this deduction. I have also beneﬁtted from Breazeale’s (Thinking Through the Wissenschaft-
slehre) and Bruno’s (‘Genealogy and Jurisprudence’) reﬂections on Fichte’s methodology during the Jena
period.
2See the Abbreviations list at the end of the paper. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
3Allison coined this phrase in his classic ‘Morality and Freedom’ essay.
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Kant denies that freedom can enjoy such primacy, for two reasons. The ﬁrst is
that we are not immediately conscious of freedom in the positive sense of
self-legislation; rather, our ﬁrst concept of freedom is merely negative, that
of independence from natural causes. The second reason is that we do not
obtain the concept of freedom from experience, since experience only
teaches us the rule of mechanism (that every eﬀect must have a cause). By
elimination, then, Kant concludes that it must be ‘the moral law [das mora-
lische Gesetz], of which we become immediately conscious (as soon as we
draw up maxims of the will for ourselves), that ﬁrst oﬀers itself to us and
[…] leads directly to the concept of freedom’ (KpV 5:29–30).4
Of course, the disclosure thesis just stated invites the following question:
‘how is consciousness of that moral law possible?’ (KpV 5:30). Kant’s reply is
that we can
become aware of pure practical laws just as we are aware of pure theoretical prin-
ciples, by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes them to us and
to the setting aside of all empirical conditions to which reason directs us.
(KpV 5:30)
What is distinctive about pure principles is that they bear the mark of neces-
sity: they express what should obtain for an object of the will (in the practical
sphere) or what must obtain for an object of possible experience (in the theor-
etical sphere). If we then attend to this ‘should’ or ‘must’, we then have reason
to infer their pure source, since we cannot derive any species of necessity from
experience. That is why Kant goes on to say in the second stage of his argu-
ment that the ‘concept of a pure will arises from the ﬁrst, as consciousness of a
pure understanding arises from the latter’ (KpV 5:30). In fact, this is the basis
for his claim that consciousness of the moral law gives us a warrant for think-
ing of ourselves as possessing a pure will. What the moral law brings to our
attention (‘as soon as we draw up maxims of the will for ourselves’) is a
kind of necessity that could not have arisen from an empirically conditioned
faculty. This means, in connection with the reciprocity thesis, that we have a
warrant for thinking of ourselves as transcendentally free.
Now what is it about this two-stage argument that has caused so much
debate among Kant’s readers? The answer, I believe, points us to the kind
of primacy Kant assigns to the moral law in his disclosure thesis. Although
he just explained that our awareness of pure practical principles is possible
4As Kant puts this thesis elsewhere:
Were this law not given to us from within, no amount of subtle reasoning on our part would
produce it or win our power of choice over to it. Yet this law is the only law that makes us con-
scious of the independence of our power of choice from determination by all other incentives (of
our freedom) and thereby also of the accountability of all our actions.
(R 6:26n)
For similar remarks, see Reﬂ 7316, 7321; KU 5:275; and MS 6:252.
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by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes them to us, many
commentators have been troubled by Kant’s further remark that our con-
sciousness of the moral law ‘may be called a fact of reason [Factum der Ver-
nunft]… because it instead forces itself upon us of itself as a synthetic a
priori proposition that is not based on any intuition, either pure or empirical’
(KpV 5:30). The diﬃculty is that it is unclear why the moral law qualiﬁes as a
‘fact’ (Factum), or why Kant would not seek to derive it from a more funda-
mental ground, or why he would not regard its underivability as a problem.
Instead, Kant views this ‘fact’ as a basis to declare, with a surprising degree
of conﬁdence, that the moral law is ‘ﬁrmly established of itself’ and the key
to a deduction of freedom (KpV 5:47). But his immediate successors were
not so optimistic in this regard, and much of the landscape of post-Kantian
ethics was shaped by an eﬀort to rethink the freedom-morality connection
presented in the second Critique.
3. Early reactions: Reinhold, Creuzer, Maimon
Signs of dissatisfaction with how Kant framed the connection between
freedom and morality are evident in Reinhold’s Attempt at a New Theory
of Human Representation, ﬁrst published in 1789. In this work Reinhold
claims that ‘[h]e who has not philosophized about freedom is as convinced
about its actuality as his own existence’ (Versuch einer neuen Theorie des
Vorstellungsvermögens, 91). Freedom, in other words, qualiﬁes as a ‘fact’
(Thatsache). However, Reinhold is careful to distance this fact from the
moral law. Freedom is a Thatsache, he writes, that one ‘knows from his
inner experience’ and that one is ‘conscious of through self-feeling [das
Selbstgefühl]’ (Versuch einer neuen Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögens, 91–
92).5 The epistemic ground of freedom is therefore independent of the
concept of an absolute practical law. We have access to it, Reinhold
argues, simply through an inner feeling of activity, of which only philoso-
phers are in the habit of doubting. What is interesting is that Reinhold
5In the second edition of his Letters on Kantian Philosophy from 1792, Reinhold links the disclosure of
freedom directly to self-consciousness:
But reason has a very real ground for thinking of freedom as an absolute cause, namely self-con-
sciousness, through which the action of this capacity [dieses Vermögens] announces itself as a fact
[Thatsache], and common and healthy understanding is entitled to infer its actuality from its
possibility.
(Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie, 283)
However, Reinhold soon came to embrace Fichte’s commitment to moral primacy by the mid 1790s.
‘Only the moral self-consciousness’, he wrote to Fichte in 1795, ‘unconditionally ascribes to the transcen-
dental subject the predicate “absolute.” For the moral law applies only to the unconditionally free action
of the subject, that is, the action which is independent of anything empirical’ (Letter to Fichte, December
1795; quoted in Bernecker, ‘Reinhold’s Road to Fichte’). For helpful accounts of this shift in Reinhold’s
project, see Henrich (Konstellationen), Di Giovanni (Freedom and Religion in Kant and His Immediate Suc-
cessors), and Bernecker (‘Reinhold’s Road to Fichte’).
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does not reject the status of the moral law as a fact; on the contrary, he
argues that to ask, ‘Is there a cognitive ground [Erkenntnisgrund] of the
moral law?’ amounts to the question, ‘Is there a moral law?’ which he
says nobody, not even philosophers, sincerely call into question (Versuch
einer neuen Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögens, 101). Yet it is clear, both
from this text and from the book version of his Letters on Kantian Philos-
ophy (1790/92), that Reinhold accepts the status of the moral law as a
fact without making it the basis for accessing our freedom.
A similar position appears in Creuzer’s Skeptical Observations on Freedom of
the Will (1793), where he argues that judgments concerning what ‘happens’
and what ‘ought to happen’ are part of the most common human understand-
ing. One need only ‘hear’ the moral law, Creuzer says, to ‘understand immedi-
ately what it is, namely, an unconditioned, unlimited, unchangeable, and
universally valid norm of our actions’ – a norm, he adds, that even the ‘great-
est evildoer’ recognizes in his heart (Skeptische Betrachtung über die Freiheit, 3).
For this reason Creuzer calls the moral law an ‘undeniable fact of human
nature’ (unläugbaren Factum der menschlichen Natur), and he appears to
side with Kant’s disclosure thesis in saying that one ‘cognizes himself as a
member of the supersensible world’ through this fact (Versuch einer neuen
Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögens, 7). Indeed, Creuzer claims that ‘indepen-
dence from foreign laws and freedom are therefore inseparably bound with
one another’ and that ‘[c]onsciousness of freedom is, like consciousness of
the moral law, a fact of reason [ein Factum der Vernunft]’ (Skeptische Betrach-
tung über die Freiheit, 8–9). However, Creuzer qualiﬁes his position in a foot-
note, saying that he agrees with Kant in making freedom the essential
ground of the moral law (its ratio essendi), but he disagrees with Kant in
making the moral law the cognitive ground of freedom (its ratio cognoscendi)
(Skeptische Betrachtung über die Freiheit, 9 n). In Creuzer’s view we have no
reason to accept the disclosure thesis because consciousness of freedom is
‘already active before the development of the moral law’ (Skeptische Betrach-
tung über die Freiheit, 9 n). In line with Reinhold, Creuzer recommends that we
should seek to explain freedom as its own ‘original immediate consciousness’
apart from our notions of duty, obligation, or law (Skeptische Betrachtung über
die Freiheit, 9 n).
Nor were Reinhold and Creuzer alone in advocating this separation. It set
the backdrop against which Maimon would propose to ‘improve’ upon
Kant’s moral philosophy, starting with his 1794 essay ‘Attempt at a New Pres-
entation of the Moral Principle and a New Deduction of Its Reality’. What is
unique about Maimon’s contribution is that he criticizes Kant’s methodology
for its ‘unscientiﬁc’ reliance upon ‘common human understanding’ (gemeinen
Menschenverstandes). Common human understanding, he says, is prone to
error and illusion, and so there is no reliable way to tell if the concepts we
develop from this standpoint rest on mere ‘psychological deception’
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(psychologische Täuschung) (‘Versuch einer neuen Darstellung des Moralprin-
cips’, 404). It may be an ‘immediate fact of consciousness’ (unmittelbare That-
sache des Bewußtseins) that the moral law issues its commands
unconditionally, but that in itself tells us nothing about the moral law’s objec-
tivity. Even if we feel ourselves under moral constraint, for instance, how do
we know that the moral law is really binding upon our will? In reply,
Maimon oﬀers a new methodology that begins with a more primary ‘fact of
consciousness’. The speciﬁc Thatsache he argues is more primary than our
everyday consciousness of duty is our ‘drive for the cognition of truth’
(Trieb zur Erkenntnis der Wahrheit) (‘Versuch einer neuen Darstellung des Mor-
alprincips’, 407), a fact he says is not suspect of psychological deception. And
this last point is crucial, since Maimon goes on to claim that as rational beings
we necessarily strive to meet a principle of ‘universal validity’ (Allgemeingültig-
keit) in our thoughts, the same principle, he contends, under which we necess-
arily strive to meet the ‘demands of duty’ in our actions (‘Versuch einer neuen
Darstellung des Moralprincips’, 419). This link to universal validity – a general
principle of reason as such – is what secures the objectivity of the moral law.
Or so Maimon argues.
In this way Maimon rejects, much more clearly than his contemporaries,
Kant’s commitment to the primacy of the moral law (the disclosure thesis).
By starting with our drive for the cognition of truth, Maimon does not presup-
pose Kant’s doctrine of the fact of reason, insofar as this doctrine operates
from the standpoint of common human understanding. For Kant, the buck
stops with our consciousness of the moral law, since there is no alternative
means for accessing the concept of an absolute practical principle. That is
why Kant says, in answer to the question, ‘how is consciousness of that
moral law possible?’, that we need only attend to its necessity (KpV 5:30).
While Reinhold and Creuzer seem to agree with this point, they both deny
that the moral law reveals our freedom to us, either because we can access
our freedom through self-feeling (Reinhold), or because our consciousness
of freedom is active prior to the moral law (Creuzer). But neither of them
went as far as Maimon in raising the skeptical possibility that Kant’s Factum
might be a grand delusion, and neither of them went as far as Maimon in
developing a foundationalist strategy for securing the moral law’s objectivity.
It is these latter, more radical developments in the history of post-Kantian
ethics that shed light on Fichte’s commitment to moral primacy, to which I
now turn.
4. Fichte’s contribution
While questions of Fichte’s intellectual development are notoriously diﬃcult
to settle, it is safe to say that his commitment to moral primacy underwent
two general phases during the 1790s.
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I. In the revised edition of his Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation (1793),
Fichte distinguishes two ways our faculties of mind can disclose their
existence to us. On the side of theoretical cognition, we have sensibility,
understanding, and reason, along with their respective objects, intui-
tions, concepts, and ideas. In each case, Fichte explains, these faculties
apply to their objects with strict necessity. As a result they ‘proclaim’
their existence to us through a consciousness of constraint: we experi-
ence their eﬀects as something ‘given’ to us, not as something we
‘produce’ (VKO 5:22). On the side of practical cognition, however,
Fichte thinks we ﬁnd something special. With the higher faculty of
desire, he argues, we have a power that applies to itself, not coercively,
but spontaneously, through the representation of its own universal
form.6 Accordingly, among the various ways our faculties of mind can
inﬂuence us, only the higher faculty of desire elicits a ‘fact’ (Thatsache)
through our common consciousness of duty that testiﬁes to the exist-
ence of an autonomous will within us (VKO 5:22–23).
II. A further phase in Fichte’s commitment to moral primacy appears in the
‘Second Introduction’ to the Wissenschaftslehre (1797), where he argues
that we have only one way to support ‘belief’ or ‘faith’ (Glaube) in the
reality of intellectual intuition: namely, ‘by exhibiting the moral law
within us’ (ZEWL 1:466). ‘Our intuition of self-activity and freedom’, he
goes on to say, has its foundation in our consciousness of this law,
‘which is unquestionably not a type of consciousness derived from any-
thing else, but is instead an immediate consciousness’. Here Fichte
speaks of a demand to self-activity, adding: ‘It is only through the
medium of the moral law that I catch a glimpse of myself; and insofar
as I view myself through this medium, I necessarily view myself as self-
active’ (ZEWL 1:466).7
6We ﬁnd a similar claim in Fichte’s 1793 review of Creuzer’s free-will book: ‘Self-activity gives this faculty its
determinate form, which is determinable in only one way and which appears as the moral law’ (CR 8:413).
7The review Fichte wrote during the autumn of 1793 on Frederich Heinrich Gebhard’s book On Ethical
Goodness as Disinterested Benevolence appears to be an anomaly within this development. At a
crucial point in his discussion, Fichte raises the question of how reason can be practical, remarking
that this must be proven and not assumed. ‘Such a proof’, he then states, ‘must proceed somewhat
as follows’:
The human being is given to consciousness as a unity (as an I). This fact can be explained only by
presupposing something in human beings that is simply unconditioned; we must therefore
assume that there is within human beings something simply unconditioned. What is simply
unconditioned, however, is practical reason.
(GR 8:425)
Beiser cites this passage as evidence of his ‘break’ with Kant (German Idealism, 291). On Beiser’s view,
what Fichte came to see clearly by 1793 was that skepticism renders any appeal to ‘facts of conscious-
ness’ empty, since facts cannot rule out the possibility that our will is dictated by mechanisms beyond
our control. Accordingly, Beiser thinks that in this review Fichte is seeking a ‘strict proof’ that treats
freedom ‘as the necessary condition of the unity of apperception, and thus as the ﬁrst principle of
the possibility of experience’ (German Idealism, 292). See also Neuhouser (Fichte’s Theory of Subjectivity,
24–26) for an admirably clear treatment of Fichte’s Gebhard review.
BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 7
One diﬀerence worth noting about the second phase, to which the System
of Ethics belongs, is that Fichte seeks to derive our conviction in freedom, not
from duty as it appears factually as a feeling of necessity in common conscious-
ness, but from the moral law as it appears conceptually as the ground of this
feeling in philosophical consciousness.8 Among the factors that contributed to
this shift in his position, there is no doubt that Maimon’s skepticism played a
crucial role. As we have seen, Maimon argues that the feeling of necessity we
attach to our ordinary experience of duty is open to suspicion. There is no way
to tell, he explains, whether this experience has an objective basis or is the
product of mere psychological deception. For this reason Maimon claims
that we need a new foundation for the moral law, one that is not only inde-
pendent of the standpoint of common consciousness, but also independent
of practical reason altogether. The more fundamental ‘fact’ he thinks provides
this foundation is theoretical, our drive for the cognition of truth.
Interestingly, while Fichte agrees that a deduction must go beyond the
facts of common consciousness, he does not think that these facts merit a
skeptical response, as Maimon does. On the contrary, Fichte is careful to
draw a distinction at the very start of the System of Ethics between two
ways we can relate to the feeling of necessity attached to our ordinary experi-
ence of duty. One is common, and it involves ‘factual cognition’ ( faktischen
Erkenntnis) of this feeling; the other is philosophical, and it involves ‘genetic
cognition’ (genetische Erkenntnis) of this feeling (SL 4:13–14).9 What lies at
the basis of this distinction, I believe, is Fichte’s view that common conscious-
ness is the ‘original form of thinking’ (ursprüngliche Denkform) for the philoso-
pher to work upon. ‘Is this original consciousness’, he asks the reader at one
point, ‘any diﬀerent from the one that we, as philosophers, have just produced
within ourselves? How could it be’, he continues,
given that it is supposed to have the same object, and given that the philoso-
pher, as such, certainly possesses no other subjective form of thinking than
that common and original form that is present in all reason [die gemeinsame
und ursprünglische aller Vernunft]?
(SL 4:31)
For Fichte, genetic cognition is cognition that goes beyond facts of common
consciousness to their higher ground, yet in a way that reproduces what is
original to reason and hence common to all.10
What is therefore primary in Fichte’s system of ethics – the ‘ground’ for the
feeling of moral compulsion noted above – is not itself a ‘fact’ on some more
8Thanks to a BJHP reviewer for pressing me to draw this distinction more sharply.
9In §1 Fichte also states, quite clearly, that aﬃrming the feeling of moral compulsion in an attitude of
Glaube is ‘suﬃcient for engendering both a dutiful disposition and dutiful conduct’ (SL 4:14).
10This is why, as Allen Wood (Fichte’s Ethical Thought) has observed, the philosopher in Fichte’s system is
always below or subordinate to the common person, even though transcendental reﬂection requires the
philosopher to go beyond or above the mere facts that present themselves to ordinary life.
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primitive level. Rather, it is an original ‘act’ of the I as such, of which the phi-
losopher can freely reproduce in the space of transcendental reﬂection. This is
why by the time he formulates the ﬁrst version of his ‘Doctrine of Science’
(Wissenschaftslehre) in 1794, Fichte breaks decisively with Reinhold who
characterized the ﬁrst principle of philosophy in terms of a ‘fact’ (Thatsache),
and coins the expression of a ‘fact/act’ (Thathandlung) to convey the original
spontaneity of his alternative ﬁrst principle. In subsequent writings from the
1790s we ﬁnd Fichte separating the concept of a ‘fact’ as what appears to
common consciousness from the concept of a ‘fact/act’ as what the philoso-
pher can access by ‘reverting inward’ and ‘intuiting’ her own self-activity. In
one place Fichte even claims that the idea of an immediate ‘intuition’ of
our self-activity is already present in Kant’s work, i.e. in our consciousness of
the moral law as a Factum (ZWEL 1:472). Although Fichte does not elaborate
upon this claim, it is worth noting that Kant sometimes speaks of a Factum in
its original Latin sense, that of ‘something done’ (and in Roman law, as a ‘deed’
imputable to the agent).11 Yet there is no question that Fichte is employing
this idea in an original way, as I wish to show, since he makes this form of
genetic moral cognition the entry-point for his form of idealism, the
Wissenschaftslehre.
Looking back, however, one might ask: Is the diﬀerence between Fichte and
Maimon not simply that Maimon locates a basis for the moral law in theoretical
reason (our drive for truth) and Fichte locates this basis in something broadly
practical (the activity of the I as such)? To be sure, there is evidence to
suggest that Fichte was attracted to foundationalism in some of his early writ-
ings, and some scholars have attempted to read the System of Ethics within this
framework. But it is clear, when we turn to the details of this work, that Fichte’s
strategy is more complex than any standard foundationalist approach. His
deduction of the moral law does not proceed in a unilinear style, from a ﬁrst
premise to a chain of inferences, but rather approaches the concept of the I
under three aspects: the objective, the subjective, and their reciprocal inter-
action.12 Though a ﬁrst principle is present in this progression, the multi-
lateral style in which the principle operates is unique, and I believe it is more
distorting than clarifying to characterize Fichte’s method in foundationalist
terms. This point of interpretation will be important when we turn to consider
Fichte’s method of moral justiﬁcation in greater detail, since he will end up
defending a version of Kant’s claim that the moral law discloses our freedom
to us. As we shall see, one diﬃculty facing a foundationalist reading is that it
cannot explain why Fichte would invoke the disclosure thesis at all.
11For an attempt to unpack these intricacies in Kant’s doctrine of the fact of reason, see Ware, ‘Rethinking
Kant’s Fact of Reason’.
12I am drawing this unilinear/multi-lateral distinction from Breazeale’s (Thinking Through the Wissenschaft-
slehre) excellent discussion of how Fichte’s methodology underwent a change from the 1794 incarnation
of the Wissenschaftslehre to the ‘new method’ lectures he delivered in the late 1790s.
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5. Regressive vs. dialectical methods
For these reasons I have reservations with how Paul Guyer (‘Fichte’s Transcen-
dental Ethics’) has presented Fichte’s deduction of the moral law, which is
otherwise well-argued and sympathetic to the aims of the System of Ethics.
Guyer interprets Fichte’s deduction as a paradigmatic case of a transcendental
argument.13 On his reading, Fichte’s starting-point concerns a distinction
between the self as active and the self as passive, and the goal of the deduction
is to investigate the conditions necessary for thinking of oneself in the former
way. More speciﬁcally, Guyer takes Fichte to begin with the following claim:
(1) In order to think of my self-consciousness, I must think of myself as not
merely having representations but as acting upon representations.
According to Guyer, Fichte’s guiding question is what further conditions are
necessary to think of ‘acting upon representations’. The answer, he thinks,
points us to the concept of willing, from which we can derive the following
chain of inferences:
(2) In order to think of myself as acting upon representations, I must think of
myself as willing.
(3) In order to think of myself as willing, I must think of myself as acting in
accordance with the concept of an end.
(4) In order to think of myself as acting in accordance with the concept of an
end, I must conceive of that end as self-suﬃcient and independent.14
13In a similar vein, Neuhouser writes:
Fichte’s rejection of Kant’s appeal to the notion of a “fact of reason” is most plausibly understood
as based upon the belief that, in taking this position, Kant fails to carry out a thoroughgoing,
consistent application of his own Critical principles to the ﬁeld of moral philosophy.
(Fichte’s Theory of Subjectivity, 27)
Others who defend this interpretation include Irie and Rivera De Rosales:
Kant’s moral philosophy places the moral law as a “fact of reason” ﬁrst and examines what the
moral law must be, if it exists. In contrast, Fichte puts the existence of self-consciousness ahead
of a system of ethics and demonstrates that an acceptance of a principle of morality is a prere-
quisite for such self-consciousness.
(Irie, ‘Der transzendentale Beweis der Sittlichkeit bei Fichte’, 13)
[In contrast to Kant] Fichte precisely wants to deduce this moral law […] Therefore, he does not
start from the moral law as a “fact of reason,” but rather seeks to explain it through its transcen-
dental conditions of possibility.
(Rivera De Rosales, ‘The Transcendental Deduction of the Categorial Imperative’, 238)
Those who ﬁnd continuity between Kant’s doctrine of the fact of reason and Fichte’s position include
Ameriks (Kant and the Fate of Autonomy), Franks (All or Nothing), Breazeale (Thinking Through the
Wissenschaftslehre), and Wood (Fichte’s Ethical Thought).
14As Guyer explains:
The key to understanding the nature of self-consciousness in general thus becomes the under-
standing of human action, and the key to understanding this is understanding freedom. The key
to understanding freedom, in turn, is to understand that activity must have its own law distinct
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(5) An end that is self-suﬃcient and independent is the concept of the moral
law.
(6) Therefore, given (1)-(5), in order to think of my self-consciousness, I must
think of myself as willing in accordance with the moral law.
On this reconstruction, Fichte is advancing a regressive style of argument, since
it begins with the premise that we must think of ourselves as active in order to
think of ourselves at all, and it then works ‘backwards’ to the conditions necess-
ary to think of such activity. The moral law receives a warrant, on this account,
because it emerges as the only concept ﬁt to serve as the end of self-active
willing. In Guyer’s view, rather than treat the moral law as an undeniable ‘fact
of reason’ that we must accept on the basis of ‘faith’, Fichte’s deduction has
the form of a transcendental argument to the conditions of self-consciousness,
which he adds ‘eluded Kant’ (‘Fichte’s Transcendental Ethics’, 147).
Guyer’s reading certainly has the virtue of bringing clarity to what is, in truth,
a long, convoluted, and even repetitive stretch of text. However, this clarity
comes at the cost of overlooking some key distinguishing features of Fichte’s
approach in Part I of the System of Ethics. One I have hinted at is that Fichte
organizes his deduction into three stages, reﬂecting the three sections of Part
I (§§1–3), and attention to these stages indicates that he is operating, not regres-
sively (as Guyer assumes), but dialectically. Fichte proceeds by issuing a problem,
i.e. to think of the I under a certain aspect, and the goal for the reader is to
proceed as far as possible under this aspect until we reach a limit, the discovery
of which motivates a transition to a new aspect. Strictly speaking, the deduction
does not commence with the assertion that I must think of myself as acting
upon representations. Rather, the deduction begins with a ‘task’ (Aufgabe):
§1. TO THINK OF ONESELF MERELY AS ONESELF, I.E. AS SEPARATED FROM EVERYTHING THAT IS
NOT OUR SELF.
(SL 4:18)
The aim of §1 is to think of the I under an objective aspect – as it is given in
reﬂection – and Fichte’s point is that the I is given in reﬂection only as willing.
Our goal is then to proceed in thinking of the objective aspect of the I as far as
possible. What we learn is that the I qua will appears to be absolute, but the
limit we encounter is that nothing under this aspect informs us about how we
from the laws that govern that which is represented merely as object, and the key to Fichte’s
transcendental derivation of the moral law is then the insight that the moral law is the only can-
didate for such a law of the distinctive activity of the self.
(‘Fichte’s Transcendental Ethics’, 139)
What Guyer then calls the ‘crucial claim’ of Fichte’s deduction is that ‘understanding oneself as self-
determining requires the concepts of practical philosophy and ultimately the recognition of oneself
as governed by the moral law’ (‘Fichte’s Transcendental Ethics’, 141). Note that Guyer draws much of
his interpretation from the Introduction to the System of Ethics, whereas I am focusing on the deduction
proper (in §§1–3 of Part I).
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can think of the will’s absoluteness. That is the limit Fichte wants us to dis-
cover in §1, and he uses it to motivate a new task in §2:
§2. TO BECOME CONSCIOUS IN A DETERMINATE MANNER OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF ONE’S
ORIGINAL BEING.
(SL 4:30)
The aim of §2 is to think of the I now under a subjective aspect – as it is
engaged in reﬂection – and Fichte’s point is that the I is engaged in reﬂection
only as intelligence. Our goal is then to proceed in thinking of the subjective
aspect of the I as far as possible. What we learn is that the I qua intelligence
is a potential power of self-activity, but the limit we encounter is that nothing
under this aspect informs us about how we can become conscious of our self-
activity as a real tendency. That is the limit Fichte wants us to discover in §2,
and he uses it to motivate a ﬁnal task in §3:
§3. TO OBSERVE HOW THE I BECOMES CONSCIOUS OF ITS OWN TENDENCY TO ABSOLUTE SELF-
ACTIVITY AS SUCH.
(SL 4:39)
This section reveals a further sense in which Fichte’s method is dialectical,
since he goes on to argue that the only way we can fulﬁll the task of §3 is
to unite the two previously separated aspects of the I, the objective and the
subjective, in a relation of ‘reciprocal interaction’ (Wechselwirkung). What
Fichte eventually claims is that we can become conscious of our self-activity
as a real tendency only by thinking of this activity under the law of absolute
self-sufﬁciency, or what amounts to the same thing, under the moral law
(SL 4:51).
Granted, this is only a brief sketch of Fichte’s deduction,15 but it contains
enough detail to show why I am hesitant to follow Guyer, who interprets
this portion of the System of Ethics along the lines of a regressive argument.
A drawback of this reading is that it renders Fichte’s ﬁnal step puzzling,
since the concept of the moral law emerges, not as a transcendental condition
of self-activity (or a condition of its being), but as an epistemic condition of
self-activity (or a condition of its knowledge). A regressive interpretation
would have us treat the moral law as the ‘ratio essendi’ of freedom, whereas
Fichte – and in this respect I take him to be following Kant – wants us to
treat the moral law as the ‘ratio cognoscendi’ of freedom. The moral law in
Fichte’s view is the law of absolute self-suﬃciency, and this is the ‘medium’
for accessing our real tendency to self-activity. Not surprisingly, Guyer believes
that Fichte’s deduction has the form of an argument which ‘eluded Kant’
(‘Fichte’s Transcendental Ethics’, 147), who he says was content to treat the
moral law as a Factum that we must accept on the basis of faith (‘Fichte’s
15See Ware, ‘Fichte’s Deduction of the Moral Law’ for a fuller discussion.
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Transcendental Ethics’, 147). Yet what Guyer does not mention is that Fichte
himself cites Kant’s Factum with approval, writing that ‘[i]n many places Kant
derives our conviction concerning freedom from our consciousness of the
moral law’ (SL 4:53). In my view, this is yet more evidence to suggest that
Fichte, in contrast to Reinhold, Creuzer, and Maimon, does not think that
we have purely theoretical or morally neutral grounds to access our
freedom in a positive sense.
6. Morality, freedom, and faith
But now the kind of skeptical worries that animated Maimon’s alternative
deduction of the moral law return with renewed force. After all, if Fichte is
rehabilitating some version of the disclosure thesis and assigning what I am
calling epistemic primacy to the moral law, it seems we have won an
account of how we become conscious of our freedom at the cost of
making the moral law (or our consciousness thereof) open to doubt.
Maimon’s question, ‘How do we know that the moral law is actually binding
upon our will?’ appears to remain unanswered, and that means Fichte’s
deduction has failed to satisfy a condition of objectivity. One obvious attrac-
tion of the Maimonian-foundationalist strategy is that it promises to rule out
skepticism about the moral law’s bindingness by deriving the law from a
theoretical ‘fact’ about our drive for truth. However, I think Fichte has
resources to address this concern, since he is careful to distinguish between
the speciﬁc actions we feel ‘should’ and ‘should not’ be done, and the concep-
tual formulation of the moral law as a law of self-suﬃciency. The aim of his
deduction is to oﬀer ‘genetic cognition’ of the former, to trace the ‘fact’ of
moral compulsion to its ‘ground’ in the reciprocal interaction of the I con-
sidered both objectively and subjectively. The bindingness of the moral law
thereby receives a warrant on Fichte’s account, since it turns out to have a
necessary connection to the ﬁrst principle of his system.
This is the sense, on my reading, in which Fichte’s deduction does satisfy a
condition of objectivity. It shows that our everyday feelings of moral compul-
sion have a rational basis and so are not a grand delusion after all. But it is
important to see why Fichte is unwilling to seek a further deduction of the
moral law itself, as the necessary manner of thinking our own freedom.
‘This is of special importance for our science’, he tells the reader, ‘so that
we can avoid being misled – as has so often been the case – into wanting
to provide a further explanation of our consciousness of having duties’ (SL
4:47; emphasis added). Fichte goes on to speak of this mistaken approach
in terms of ‘wanting to derive’ our consciousness of having duties ‘from
grounds outside of itself’, which is, he adds, ‘impossible’ and contrary to the
‘dignity and absoluteness of the law’ (SL 4:47).16 While our everyday feelings
of moral compulsion admit of a deduction, their higher ground does not lie in
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a theoretical or non-moral fact (pace Maimon). For Fichte, their higher ground
lies in the absolute activity of the I as such, which we can think of objectively
as a law of self-suﬃciency. Of course, Kant has his own reasons for regarding a
deduction of the moral law as unnecessary, since he thinks that in order to see
how our consciousness of the moral law is possible, all we need to do is attend
to the necessity with which reason prescribes its claims to us (KpV 5:29–30).
Yet both Kant and Fichte agree that the buck stops with the moral law,
meaning that the ultimate source of its normativity cannot be derived from
‘antecedent data’ (such as we might gather from an analysis of theoretical
reason).17
This puts us in a better position to see what motivates Fichte’s claim
that idealism is for those who have faith in freedom. In the System of
Ethics Fichte arrives at this point because, on his view, a derivation of
freedom would destroy freedom: it would trace the appearance of abso-
luteness to another ground, and thereby render the appearance illusory.
Freedom in this way counts as a fact of consciousness, and for that
reason one is always at liberty to explain this appearance further. But if,
Fichte adds,
one nevertheless decides not to explain this appearance any further and decides
to consider it to be absolutely inexplicable, i.e. to be the truth, and indeed our
sole truth, according to which all other truth has to be measured and judged
– and our entire philosophy is based on precisely this decision – then this is
16We ﬁnd an equally clear statement to this eﬀect in Fichte’s essay, ‘On the Basis of Our Belief in a Divine
Governance of the World’, published in 1798:
Therefore, conviction in our moral vocation already ﬂows from a moral voice and is belief or faith
[Glaube]; and in this respect one speaks quite correctly in saying that belief or faith is the
element of all certainty [das Element aller Gewissheit ist Glaube]. – And so it must be, since mor-
ality, insofar as it is morality, can be constituted absolutely only through itself and in no way
through some logically coercive thought.
(GGW 5:182)
A page later Fichte continues:
That I should and what I should is the ﬁrst and most immediate. This permits no further expla-
nation, justiﬁcation, or authorization; it is known for itself, and it is true for itself. It is grounded
and determined by no other truth; instead, all other truth is rather grounded in it. – Whoever
says, “I must ﬁrst know whether I can [do something] before I judge whether I should,” either
abrogates the primacy of the moral law [den Primat des Sittengesetzes], and thereby the moral
law itself, when he judges this way practically, or he completely misrecognizes the original
course of reason when he judges this way speculatively.
(GGW 5:183–84)
Thanks to a BJHP reviewer for directing my attention to this essay.
17As a BJHP reviewer has helped me to see, the diﬀerence between Maimon and Fichte is not just a matter
of where they locate the basis of their deduction, with Maimon privileging a theoretical ground and
Fichte privileging a practical ground. The diﬀerence is that Maimon’s deduction of the moral law
goes beyond the standpoint of common reason altogether: it seeks a purely theoretical ‘fact’. Fichte’s
deduction, by contrast, seeks to give a philosophical investigation (and ultimately, a justiﬁcation) of
our common standpoint. While Fichte arrives at conclusions only accessible to the transcendental phi-
losopher – concerning, above all, the concept of the moral law – his entire approach remains ‘inside’, as
it were, the framework of common reason.
14 O. WARE
not because of any theoretical insight, but because of a practical interest. I will to
be self-suﬃcient, and I therefore take myself to be so. Such a taking-to-be-true,
however, is faith [Glaube].
(SL 4:25–26)
It is only at the end of the deduction in §3, however, that Fichte spells out this
‘practical interest’ in terms of Kant’s Factum of reason, which he says ‘derives
our conviction concerning freedom from our consciousness of the moral law’
(SL 4:53). Once again Fichte writes that one might wish to explain the
appearance of freedom further and ‘thereby transform it into an illusion’ (SL
4:53). But now Fichte adds a new detail: he explicitly connects our practical
interest for not transforming freedom into an illusion with our consciousness
of the moral law:
If, however, one does not go beyond the moral law, then one also does not
go beyond the appearance of freedom, which thereby becomes for us the
truth, inasmuch as the proposition, ‘I am free; freedom is the sole true
being and the ground of all other being,’ is quite diﬀerent from the prop-
osition, ‘I appear to myself to be free’. What can be derived from conscious-
ness of the moral law, therefore, is faith in the objective validity of this
appearance [of freedom].
(SL 4:54)
What this passage shows, on my reading, is that Fichte is radicalizing Kant’s
disclosure thesis in two ways. First, he regards consciousness of the moral
law as a basis to assent to the appearance of freedom, whereas Kant
regards moral consciousness as a basis to infer a faculty of a pure will
within us (the faculty of pure practical reason). Although Fichte speaks of
a ‘derivation’ in this context, what is derived on his account is the subjective
attitude of ‘taking-to-be-true’ (Fürwahrhalten), and the object of that attitude
is the sheer absoluteness of freedom as such, not an underlying faculty. Sec-
ondly, and relatedly, while Kant’s disclosure thesis would entitle one to
afﬁrm the ﬁrst part of Fichte’s proposition, ‘I am free’, it would not entitle
one to afﬁrm the second part, that ‘freedom is the sole true being and
the ground of all other being’ (SL 4:54). For Kant, what the moral law
brings to our awareness is the real possibility of acting against our sensible
inclinations as a sum-total, and that warrants our claim to possessing a
higher faculty of self-determination (a ‘pure will’). But there is no sense in
which, for Kant, the real possibility of freedom extends our cognition to
‘the ground of all other being’, even if we qualify all talk of ‘being’ to the
strictly idealist (or non-dogmatic) sense Fichte wants to uphold. Whatever
we make of these two departures, there is no doubt that Fichte is putting
the disclosure thesis to novel use by making consciousness of the moral
law fundamental, not just to his doctrine of ethics, but also to his doctrine
of science as a whole.
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7. Entering the Wissenschaftslehre
This brings us at last to what has become a major interpretive controversy in
Fichte scholarship. What lies at the core of this controversy is a question of
how Fichte frames the entry-point of the Wissenschaftslehre, and how he con-
siders the relationship between (a) consciousness of the moral law and (b) the
indubitability of his ﬁrst principle, the freedom of the I as such. On a non-mor-
alistic reading, as defended by Paul Franks (All or Nothing), Fichte’s strategy
appeals ﬁrst to the philosopher’s intellectual intuition of her own self-activity,
without referring to notions of duty, obligation, or law, and only after estab-
lishing the ﬁrst principle on theoretical grounds does she then appeal to
the moral law (among other concepts) in deriving a complete set of con-
ditions for this principle’s application (Franks, All or Nothing, 319, 324, 325).
On this line of interpretation, a form of non-moral intellectual intuition of
self-activity provides access to the Wissenschaftslehre’s ﬁrst principle (Franks,
All or Nothing, 318). The starting-point of the doctrine of science is therefore
‘practically neutral’. The transcendental philosopher, in order to enter into
the system of idealism, does not require anything like consciousness of the
moral law.
On a moralistic reading, as defended by Karl Ameriks (Kant and the Fate of
Autonomy), Frederick Beiser (German Idealism), and Daniel Breazeale (Thinking
Through the Wissenschaftslehre), our point of entry into the doctrine of science
is practical in a very strong sense.18 Consciousness of the moral law, on this
view, is the philosopher’s pre-condition for adopting the system of idealism.
As Breazeale presents this claim,
Fichte did not think that such a system could be established on purely theoretical
foundations, inasmuch as it presupposes the kind of practically grounded belief in
the reality of human freedom that – as he repeatedly conceded – is based upon
a morally motivated decision not to doubt the reality of the same.
(Thinking Through the Wissenschaftslehre, 266)
What Breazeale calls ‘the ultimate certainty of human freedom’ comes from
‘one’s “normative” intuition of actual moral obligations rather than any
purely speculative or transcendental intuition of the original spontaneity of
the I’ (Thinking Through the Wissenschaftslehre, 267). In this way Breazeale
denies that non-moral intellectual intuition of self-activity is prior to the
‘moral resolve’ at the basis of our conviction in the reality of freedom, and
so it does not serve to establish (as Franks upholds) the philosopher’s entry-
point into the Wissenschaftslehre.
18Sebastian Gardner defends a similar claim in an illuminating essay devoted to comparing Fichte and
Schelling. As he explains, Fichte ‘identiﬁes the supremacy of practical reason with the categoricality
of moral demands – an alignment which in Schelling’s eyes disqualiﬁes it, by subordinating the uncon-
ditioned to the inherent conditionedness of morality’ (‘Fichte and Schelling’, 334).
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Where does the account I have presented in this paper ﬁt within this
dispute? In my view, the way Fichte appropriates Kant’s Factum to support con-
viction in the reality of freedom as ‘the sole true being and the ground of all
other being’ (SL 4:54) is evidence to suggest that consciousness of the moral
law plays a key role in supporting his system of idealism. Yet that is not to
say I agree entirely with the moralistic reading, since this reading admits of
two versions which commentators are not always careful to distinguish. On a
strong version of this reading, it is one’s experience of moral compulsion
from the standpoint of common consciousness that secures the ﬁrst principle
of Fichte’s idealism. On a weak version, by contrast, the entry-point to this
ﬁrst principle comes from one’s cognition of the ground of this experience
from the standpoint of philosophical reﬂection. In other words, the very
notion of ‘moral primacy’ in Fichte’s system remains ambiguous unless we sep-
arate (1) duty as it appears factually in common consciousness from (2) the
moral law as it appears conceptually in philosophical consciousness, and it is
the latter, on my reading, that reveals the underlying principle of duty in
terms of self-suﬃciency. This is precisely the distinction Fichte draws in the
System of Ethics between ‘factual’ and ‘genetic’ cognition of our moral nature.
With this distinction in view, I am willing to endorse a weak moralistic
reading, since it ﬁts Fichte’s own use of the disclosure thesis. To quote the rel-
evant passage once more, Fichte tells us that if ‘one does not go beyond the
moral law, then one also does not go beyond the appearance of freedom’ (SL
4:54; emphasis added). As I understand it, the sense of the ‘moral law’ in this
passage is the ‘law of self-suﬃciency’ Fichte had formulated qua philosopher,
not the feeling of moral ‘compulsion’ he introduced at the beginning of the
work qua ordinary person. After all, the aim of his deduction is precisely to
‘go beyond’ the latter feeling as a fact of common consciousness and
reveal its rational source. What strikes me as a ﬂaw to the strong moralistic
reading is that, by making an ordinary ‘normative’ intuition of moral obli-
gations the basis for securing the ﬁrst principle of the Wissenschaftslehre, it
forces us to view Fichte as a kind of Reinholdian philosopher who argues
regressively from facts of consciousness, which does not square with the
textual evidence we have before us. Worse still, this reading renders
Fichte’s deduction of the moral law viciously circular. For it would have us
treat our common consciousness of obligations as a basis to derive conviction
in the reality of freedom, whereas Fichte himself introduces such conscious-
ness in Part I as precisely what stands in need of a deduction.19
19At the level of transcendental reﬂection – to which Fichte guides the reader in §3 of the System of Ethics
– the moral law is the ‘the conceptual consciousness that the I has of its freedom’, as a BJHP reviewer
puts it. On my view, this is another instance in which Fichte is radicalizing Kant’s disclosure thesis, since
he views freedom and morality as two aspects of the I as such, rather than as two co-entailing concepts
(pace Kant’s reciprocity thesis). See Wood (Fichte’s Ethical Thought, 123) and Ware (‘Fichte’s Deduction of
the Moral Law’) for further discussion.
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To be clear, the ordinary person need not go beyond the feeling of compul-
sion that comes attached to her awareness of obligations,20 but the philosopher
must, in Fichte’s view, if she wants to secure knowledge of her moral nature. Yet
this does not mean the philosopher must go beyond the moral law itself; that is
the mistaken strategy of those who want to ‘derive’ our consciousness of having
duties ‘from grounds outside of itself’, which Fichte says is contrary to the
‘dignity and absoluteness of the law’ (SL 4:47). In other words, genetic cognition
brings us to the moral law as the necessary manner of thinking our own
freedom, but we should not then seek some independent ground to derive
this manner of thinking (for example, by linking it to our drive for the cognition
of truth). It is the dignity and absoluteness of the law, for Fichte, which supports
one’s refusal to transform the appearance of freedom into an illusion. And that is
the nature of his commitment to moral primacy, on my account. Of course, this
is not to deny that Fichte appeals to non-moral forms of intellectual intuition to
initiate transcendental reﬂection. But it is to deny that such theoretical intuition
serves to ground the subjective attitude of ‘taking’ freedom ‘to-be-true’ (Für-
wahrhalten), which is, for Fichte, the all-important ‘decision’ at the basis of his
science of knowledge.
8. Closing remarks
Though Fichte would end up radicalizing Kant’s ‘fact of reason’ for the pur-
poses of the Wissenschaftslehre, there is no question that he was the great
champion of the disclosure thesis when compared to his contemporaries,
all of whom were resistant to making the moral law a condition for
knowing our freedom. Little did Fichte know, as fate would have it, that he
would also be the last champion, as the course of philosophy in the nine-
teenth century redoubled the initial suspicions of Reinhold, Creuzer, and
Maimon, leading some of the most prominent thinkers of the age to decry
Kant’s Factum as ‘the last undigested log in our stomach, a revelation given
to reason’ (Hegel) or as ‘a Delphic temple in the soul from whose dark holiness
issue oracular sayings’ (Schopenhauer).21 Yet despite these later reactions,
Fichte’s contribution remains of crucial interest, not only for understanding
the history of ethics after Kant, but also for presenting us with an alternative
(and to this day novel) method of moral justiﬁcation. Whatever our attitudes
wemay have toward the ‘disclosure’ of the moral law, we have much to learn, I
believe, from the individual who made this disclosure the basis for an entire
system of idealism.
20For Fichte, the ordinary person need only follow the dictates of ‘conscience’ (das Gewissen), which he
characterizes in terms of our higher faculty of feeling. See Ware, ‘Fichte on Conscience’ for further
discussion.
21Cited in Henrich, The Unity of Reason, 69.
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Abbreviations
Kant Citations to Kant appear in the order of abbreviation, volume number,
and page number from the Akademie Ausgabe, Kants Gesammelte
Schriften, edited by Königlich‐Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaf-
ten (29 vols. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1900).
KpV Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788). Translated by Mary Gregor: Cri-
tique of Practical Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2015).
KU Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790). Translated by Eric Matthews and Paul
Guyer: Critique of the Power of Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2001).
MS Die Metaphysik der Sitten (1797). Translated by Mary Gregor: The Meta-
physics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
R Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1790). Trans-
lated by Allen Wood and George di Giovanni: Religion within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2018).
Reﬂ Reﬂexionen (notes written by Kant), various dates. Translated by Paul
Guyer, Curtis Bowman, and Frederick Rauscher: Notes and Fragments
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
Fichte Citations to Fichte appear in the order of abbreviation, volume
number, and page number from Fichtes Werke, edited by I. H.
Fichte (11 vols. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1971).
GGW ‘Ueber den Grund unsers Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung’
(1798). My translations: ‘On the Basis of Our Belief in a Divine Govern-
ance of the World.’
GWL Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre (1794). My translations:
Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre.
CR ‘Recension Creuzer’ (1793). Translated by Daniel Breazeale: ‘Review of
Leonhard Creuzer, Skeptical Reﬂections on the Freedom of the Will
(1793).’ Philosophical Forum 32 (2002): 289–296.
SL Das System der Sittenlehre nach den Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre
(1798). Translated by Daniel Breazeale and Günter Zöller: The
System of Ethical Theory According to the Principles of the Wissenschaft-
slehre (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
VKO Versuch einer Kritik aller Oﬀenbarung (1793). Translated by Garret
Green: Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010).
ZWEL Zweite Einleitung in der Wissenschaftslehre (1797). Translated by
Daniel Breazeale: Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre
(Indiana: Hackett, 1994).
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